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BAD FAITH CASE LAW IN MISSISSIPPI - MIRED IN A LIN-
GUISTIC BOG? Reserve Life Insurance Company v. McGee,
444 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1983).
On February 18, 1980, an agent for the Reserve Life Insurance
Company went to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Henry McGee at
the request of the McGees, to discuss hospitalization insurance
for Mr. McGee.' McGee, 61 years old, had a third grade educa-
tion and assembled lawn mower wheels for a living.' The insurance
agent filled out an application which McGee signed. The applica-
tion included fifteen "yes" or "no" questions relating to the physical
condition and medical history of the applicant,' and there was con-
flicting testimony at trial as to whether the agent read all of the
questions to McGee before checking favorable answers.
McGee contended that the agent asked only one question, about
his health in general, and that McGee replied that he was in "good"
health and had been examined by a physician within the previous
five years. The agent classified the applicant's heath as "excellent."
The insurance company was authorized to obtain medical infor-
mation from the physician named by the applicant. The policy
was issued to McGee on March 16, 1980; monthly premiums were
paid by bank draft.4
McGee was hospitalized in September of 1980 for tests and
subsequent surgical removal of a cancerous tumor from his blad-
der. Later in the month McGee filed a claim with the insurance
company. The company at that time began an investigation of
McGee's medical history. McGee had follow-up surgery in
December 1980, then submitted a second claim to the insurance
company. By letter dated February 12, 1981, the insurance com-
pany informed McGee that the policy was being rescinded based
on medical records which revealed that McGee had made at least
ten visits to his physician within five years and had been treated
on two occasions for transient ischemic attack (slight stroke). The
company then attempted to refund the amount of all premiums
paid by McGee.'
McGee filed suit on April 1, 1981, contending that his claims
were covered by the policy which the insurance company had can-
celled ab initio.' The insurance company averred that McGee made
I. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. McGee, 444 So. 2d 803, 804 (Miss. 1983).
2. Record at 74.
3. Magee, 444 So. 2d at 813-14.
4. Id. at 804-05.
5. Id. at 805.
6. Id. at 806.
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false statements on the application for insurance and contended
that the alleged false statements materially affected the risk to be
assumed by the company, thus giving the company the right to
cancel the policy under the authority of Section 83-9-11(3) of the
Mississippi Code of 1972.' A jury trial resulted in a verdict for
McGee and an award of $2,416 as proceeds owed under the in-
surance policy and $158,000 as punitive damages.8 The Supreme
Court of Mississippi affirmed the decision of the trial court.9
BAD FAITH LAW AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MISSISSIPPI
Reserve Life Insurance Company v. McGee is only the third
case based on breach of insurance contract in which the Supreme
Court of Mississippi has upheld an award of punitive damages.1
The Reserve Life case can be said to fall in the category of ac-
tions known as "bad faith" cases." Although the Supreme Court
of Mississippi has eschewed use of the term "bad faith,"12 attor-
neys have accepted the rubric to apply generally to a cause of
action involving the liability of an insurance company for extra-
contractual damages, including, most particularly, punitive
damages."
California courts have been credited with the origin of bad faith
law." In the 1968 decision of Wetherbee v. United Insurance Com-
pany of America" and the 1970 decision of Fletcher v. Western
National Life Insurance Company, 6 the California Court of Ap-
peals held in each case that the insurer's failure to pay disability
benefits was a breach of the insurance contract, that said breach
sounded in both contract and tort, and that a jury award of puni-
tive damages was proper. 7 In the 1973 case of Gruenberg v. Aetna
7. Id. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-9-11(3) (1972) states: "The falsity of any statement in the application for
any policy covered by §§ 83-9-1 to 83-9-21 may not bar the right to recovery thereunder unless such false
statement materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer."
8. Magee, 444 So. 2d at 804. The agent for the insurance company was also a defendant in the trial court
but was nonsuited at the conclusion of the evidence. Record at 209.
9. Magee, 444 So. 2d at 812.
10. See Freeland & Freeland, Bad Faith Litigation: A Practical Analysis, 53 Miss. L.J. 237, 265 and n. 159
(1983), for a review of Mississippi cases in which trial court awards of punitive damages were at issue.
I1. For an exhaustive list of Mississippi insurance bad faith/punitive damages cases, see Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Miss. v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d 833, 846-47 (Miss. 1984), reh'g denied, (1985) (Robertson, I., con-
curring).
12. Magee, 444 So. 2d at 807.
13. See W. DENTON & W. WALKER, BAD FAITH LITIGATION IN MISSISSIPPI § 1 (1981).
14. Hughes, Standard Life Insurance Company of Indiana v. Veal: A Perspective Look at Punitive Damages
in Mississippi. I Miss. C. L. REV. 21, 21 (1978).
15. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1968).
16. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1970).
17. These cases were decided in derogation of the traditional concept of limited recovery for breach of
insurance contract, wherein damages are limited to the amount of the policy, in other words, only the damages
forseeable at the execution of the contract. Miller, Overview of the Problem of Bad Faith and Punitive Damages,
15 FORUM 194, 195 (1979).
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insurance Company,18 the California Supreme Court held that
"when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds pay-
ment of the claim of the insured, it is subject to liability in tort."
9
The Gruenberg test of reasonableness was adopted by the Califor-
nia courts, and upon proof of unreasonableness (bad faith), a broad
range of extra contractual compensatory and punitive damages
became available to the California plaintiff-insured. Dollar
amounts as high as $630,000 were awarded as punitive damages. "
The large verdicts awarded in the California bad faith cases
rapidly caught the attention of trial lawyers across the country,
and the California cases have undisputedly affected insurance law
in this state. It has become customary for a complaint in a case
brought by insured against insurer to include a prayer for puni-
tive damages. 1 A manual entitled Bad Faith Litigation"2 has been
published as a practical handbook for Mississippi attorneys
representing potential plaintiffs and defendants in such actions,
and the topic is a popular one for articles in professional jour-
nals 3 and seminars."
Long before the California bad faith cases were decided,
however, it was well established in Mississippi that punitive
damages may be awarded in an action based on breach of con-
tract if the breach is accompanied by conduct constituting a tort
for which punitive damages are recoverable.25 The traditional rule
in Mississippi is that "[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for
breach of contract unless such breach is attended by some inten-
tional wrong, insult, abuse or gross negligence which amounts
to an independent tort."2 " Damages in breach of insurance con-
tract cases are generally limited to the amount due under the policy
and, in some situations, interest on that amount.27
In 1977 the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized for the first
time that an insurance company's arbitrary refusal to pay proceeds
under an insurance contract could in and of itself be an intentional
18. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
19. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
20. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAc. L.J. 833, 846-47 (1982).
21. Hughes, supra note 14, at 22.
22. W. DENTON & W. WALKER, Bad Faith Litigation in Mississippi (1981).
23. See, e.g., Minor, Proving Bad Faith of An Insurer, TRIAL, Aug. 1984, at 17; Walker, Properly Limit-
ing the "Arguable Reason"Defense to the Independent Tort of Bad Faith, VOIR DIRE, Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 14.
24. See, e.g., P. Minor, The Tort of Bad Faith, Jewels of the Practice: -'ips of the Trade," Miss. Trial
Lawyers' Ass'n Seminar (May 31, 1985).
25. D. L. Fair Lumber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770 (1944).
26. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Crews, 341 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Miss. 1977); Progressive Casualty Co.
v. Keys, 317 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1975); D. L. Fair Lumber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770
(1944); American Railway Express Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 107 So. 761 (1926); Hood v. Moffett, 109
Miss. 757, 69 So. 644 (1915).
27. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 329 So. 2d 670, 673 (Miss. 1976).
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wrong constituting an independent tort. In the landmark decision of
Standard Life Insurance Company of Indiana v. Veal,2" the court
concluded that the insurance company's refusal to pay the legiti-
mate claim in that case amounted to an independent tort, and
punitive damages were assessed against the insurance company."
The Veal court began its discussion of the question of punitive
damages with the admonition that "punitive damages are assessed
as an example and warning to others and should be allowed only
with caution and within narrow limits."3" In Veal, the insurer
denied a claim for credit life insurance proceeds, originally bas-
ing its denial on reasons contrary to the express terms of the in-
surance contract, and the court stated that the insurer had "no
reason whatever to justify its action."3 The court recognized the
inequality of bargaining positions of insurer and insured, setting
out its philosophy as follows:
This case demonstrates the necessity of awarding punitive damages when an insurance
company refuses to pay a legitimate claim, and bases its refusal to honor the claim on
a reason clearly contrary to the express provisions of its own policy. If an insurance com-
pany could not be subjected to punitive damages it could intentionally and unreasonably
refuse payment of a legitimate claim with veritable impunity. To permit an insurer to deny
a legitimate claim, and thus force a claimant to litigate with no fear that claimant's max-
imum recovery could exceed the policy limits plus interest, would enable the insurer to
pressure an insured to a point of desperation enabling the insurer to force an inadequate
settlement or avoid payment entirely."
The court added the now often quoted words of caution: "Of
course, if an insurance company has a legitimate reason or
arguable reason for failing to pay a claim, punitive damages will
not lie .... ""
In 1979 the Supreme Court of Mississippi for the second time
upheld a jury award of punitive damages in an insurance bad faith
case. In Travelers Indemnity Company v. Wetherbee, " punitive
damages were assessed against a fire insurer for "tortious breach
of contract."" Alluding to the imbalance in bargaining positions
which favors the insurance company in prolonged settlement
negotiations, the court concluded that the punitive damages in-
28. 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977). It should be noted that this decision was a four-four affirmance; Justice
Bowling abstained because he had tried the case below.
29. Id. at 248. The court did not name the tort, but the appellation "bad faith tort" has been suggested by
interested writers. W. DENTON & W. WALKER, SUpra note 13, at 33-34; Freeland & Freeland, supra note 10,
at 238.
30. Veal, 354 So. 2d at 247.
31. Id. at 248.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 368 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1979).
35. Id. at 833.
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was properly granted due to unreasonable delay on the part of
the insurance company in arriving at settlement, the delay being
in complete disregard for the express terms of the policy."' The
court surmised that the insurer's nonpayment was based purely
on economic gain and, citing Veal, labeled the nonpayment "in-
tentional withholding ...a gross breach, the equivalent of an
independent tort." 7
In both Veal and Wetherbee, the Mississippi Supreme Court
closely analyzed the individual fact situations to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of punitive damages. In each
case the court found an "independent tort," but without elabora-
tion. The elements of the tort were not defined; neither was the
tort given a name. No precise guidelines were set out for the evalu-
ation of the merits of a bad faith insurance claim. Although not
articulating a set of rules, the court adopted a method of review-
ing independently the facts of each insurance bad faith case to
determine justification for the imposition of extra-contractual
damages.
Lawyers and legal writers in Mississippi have asked the court
to clarify the law in this area, 8 urging the court to delineate the
legal principles governing the "arguable reason" test of Veal. They
have made proposals for the logical trial court analysis of bad
faith cases, submitting that the determination of whether the in-
surance company had an arguable reason for failing to pay the
claim is one for the trial court to make. 9 Of primary interest has
been the question of when the plaintiff-insured becomes entitled
to have the issue of punitive damages submitted to the jury."4
ANALYSIS
In Reserve Life, Justice Bowling, writing for the court, ac-
knowledged the controversy surrounding the principles announced
in Veal. He stated that "[t]he difficulty seems to be in determin-
ing who makes the decision whether or not the insurance compa-
ny has a 'legitimate reason' or an 'arguable reason' for failure to
pay the claim."" He then set out a multiple-step procedure to be
followed by trial courts in the resolution of insurance bad faith
cases. 42
36. Id. at 834.
37. id. at 835.
38. Magee, 444 So. 2d at 808.
39. See supra note 10, § IV.
40. Magee, 444 So. 2d at 808.
41. Id. at 809,
42. Id. at 809-10.
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Ideally, according to the majority opinion, the trial court should
first determine at the conclusion of the evidence "whether or not,
as a question of law, the insurer had a legitimate or arguable rea-
son to deny payment of the claim." 3 If the court determines that
the insurer had a legitimate or arguable reason to deny payment,
the jury is to be given the sole question of the insurer's contractu-
al liability on the policy. No punitive damages instruction is to
be submitted to the jury in that event.
The majority opinion continued by stating that if "the trial court
determines that as a matter of law it cannot hold that the insurer
had a legitimate and arguable defensive position, but [the trail
court can determine] that the evidence constituted disputed facts
as to whether or not such situation existed, then the trial court
should submit that issue to the jury."" Thirdly, the trial court
should then "make a determination as to whether or not the evi-
dence is sufficient to submit a punitive damages instruction to the
jury under the guidelines set out in Veal . . .,.
After setting forth this one-two-three-step procedural approach,
the majority elaborated on the decision of the trial court, noting
in summary that the evidence on the record of the Reserve Life
case clearly presented a jury question as to whether the insur-
ance company had an arguable excuse for denial of the insured's
claim; that is, whether the insured made a false statement on the
insurance application which materially affected the risk to be as-
sumed by the insurer. Additionally, the majority approved the
submission of the punitive damages instruction to the jury. The
court found that the evidence supported the action of the jury in
granting punitive damages to the insured as well as proceeds un-
der the insurance policy."
Justice Robertson, joined by Justice Prather and joined in part
by Presiding Justice Walker, specially concurred with the hold-
ing of the majority, affirming the punitive damages judgment of
the trial court but rejecting the majority view that a jury issue
existed on the question of the insurance company's liability un-
der the policy. He concluded that McGee was entitled to a direct-
ed verdict on the issue of Reserve Life's liability on the insurance
contract, stating that he would hold as a matter of law that where
an insurance applicant executes an authorization for his physi-
43. Id. at 809.
44. ld.
45. Id. at 810.
46. Id. at 810-12.
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cian to release medical information to the insurance company,
the company is charged with knowledge of whatever information
could be obtained from the physician upon investigation. 7
Justice Robertson submitted that the majority position was log-
ically inconsistent, creating a "linguistic bog.""' He stated that if
there were a jury question as to the insurer's liability under the
policy, it would follow that a defense had been raised which could
be classified as legitimate or arguable, and thus the issue of puni-
tive damages should not have been submitted to the jury. Recall-
ing the arguable reason test of Veal, Justice Robertson stated, "If
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find facts which
would undergird a successful policy defense, the same evidence
surely would justify a reasonable insurance company in so con-
cluding."49
Justice Robertson suggested that the punitive damages issue
should be submitted to the jury only in the event that the plaintiff-
insured is entitled to a peremptory instruction on his claim on the
insurance contract. Stated in simple terms, if doubt as to contrac-
tual liability is sufficient to make it a jury issue, there is no rea-
son for the insurer to be punished for delaying payment and
presenting a defense. He urged the court to adopt this position,
a position to which Alabama subscribes."0
He further advocated that in all bad faith tort cases where the
trial court holds that there is sufficient evidence to support the
submission of the punitive damages issue to the juiy, the court
should use the special verdict provided under Rule 49(b) of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Separate questions should
be made of the fact issues of the insurer's policies and defenses
and of the tort and punitive damages questions. When this proce-
dure is followed, the supreme court is able to make a final dispo-
sition of the case on appeal.5"
Presiding Justice Walker, joined by Presiding Justice Broom,
47. Id. at 815-16.
48. Id. at 815.
49. Id. at 816.
50. Id. at 817. Justice Robertson quoted from Nat'l. Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357, 1362
(Ala. 1982):
In the normal case in order for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of bad faith refusal to pay
an insurance claim, the proof offered must show that the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on
the contract claim and, thus, entitled to recover on the contract claim as a matter of law. Ordinarily,
if the evidence produced by either side creates a fact issue with regard to the validity of the claim
and, thus, the legitimacy of the denial thereof, the tort claim must fail and should not be submitted
to the jury.
For a list of bad faith cases decided in Alabama, see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss. v. Campbell, 466
So. 2d 833, 844 (Miss. 1984), petition for rehg denied, (1985) (J. Hawkins on petition for rehearing).
51. Magee, 444 So. 2d at 818.
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dissented from the majority holding in Reserve Life, calling the
punitive damages award of $158,000 "wholly unjustified"52 and
further stating that "[i]f there were ever a case where the insur-
ance company had an arguable reason to refuse payment of the
claim of $2,416.00, this is one."" He joined Justice Robertson
in the view that if the issue of the insurer's liability on the policy
were one for the jury then as a matter of law the issue of punitive
damages should not have been submitted to the jury."
Justice Walker inserted a practical note, stating that the general
public as insurance policyholders will eventually bear the cost of
punitive damages assessed against insurance companies, and he
urged legislative action which would limit the amount of damages
awarded to "actual expenses received in bringing suit plus double
or triple the sum found to be due under the policy. Such a proce-
dure would provide an adequate remedy to policyholders who had
a legitimate claim against a recalcitrant insurance company. " "
CONCULSION
The right of a plaintiff-insured to collect punitive damages from
a defendant-insurer where there is a tortious breach of insurance
contract has now clearly been established in Mississippi. The
Supreme Court of Mississippi has stated that it will analyze care-
fully the factual situation in each individual case and will not al-
low punitive damages if the insurance company has an arguable
reason for denying the claim. The Reserve Life case is only the
third insurance bad faith case in which a judgment of punitive
damages has been affirmed by the court. This suggests that puni-
tive damages will be allowed only in those cases where the court
finds grossly inequitable conduct on the part of the insurance com-
pany sufficient to justify drastic punishment. The result in the
Reserve Life case was approved by seven justices who obviously
believed that the action of the insurance company in withholding
payment was clearly wrongful and deserving of punishment.
In Reserve Life the Mississippi Supreme Court attempted to
delineate the principles of insurance bad faith law as first
propounded in the seminal case of Standard Life Insurance Com-
pany of Indiana v. Veal.5" In so doing, however, the majority of
the court approved a procedural method which could be inter-
52. Id. at 819.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss. 1977).
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preted to indicate that the court would allow the jury first to de-
termine the disputed contractual liability and then, if the matter
is resolved in favor of the plaintiff-insured, proceed to assess the
defendant-insurer with punitive damages for raising a defense to
the contractual claim. Such an interpretation would mean that the
jury could be in a position to give the unsuccessful insurance com-
pany what is referred to in sports circles as the "old one-two
punch."
Justices Robertson and Prather criticized the language of the
majority opinion and maintained that the rule followed by the
Alabama Supreme Court is correct - the court, not the jury,
should determine if there are grounds to punish the insurer-
defendant. Under these justices' theory, punitive damages should
never be considered by the jury unless there is contractual liabil-
ity as a matter of law. Under the Alabama rule, the trial judge
stands at the door of the jury room and, having directed a verdict
on the contractual claim, determines if the jury is to consider tort
liability.
There are now a number of bad faith/punitive damages cases
pending before the Mississippi Supreme Court, and trial lawyers
look for more procedural discussions from the court regarding
this area. Insurance bad faith law continues to be in a state of
flux as it develops, and other changes may be expected in the
semantics of the court and its procedural methods."
Linda T. Greaves
57. In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss. v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1984), petition for rehg
denied, (1985), a case which interestingly did not involve an award of punitive damages, the Mississippi Supreme
Court reviewed and elaborated on the punitive damages guidelines set out in the majority holding in Reserve
Life. Justice Hawkins, writing for the majority of the court on the denial of the petition for rehearing, summa-
rized the thrust of the Reserve Life procedural steps:
When the presentation of all evidence has been completed by both sides, it is the function and respon-
sibility of the trial court to determine whether the insurance carrier had a reasonably arguable basis,
either in fact or in law, to deny the claim. If he finds there was a reasonably arguable basis to deny
the claim, then the plaintiff is not entitled to have the jury consider any "bad faith" award against the
insurance company.
Any plaintiff asking for punitive damages, or any special or extraordinary damages based upon "bad
faith" of an insurance company has a heavy burden.
Blue Cross, 466 So. 2d at 842.
Justice Hawkins further stated that "in the vast majority of cases" there will be no bad faith question submit-
ted to the jury unless a directed verdict on the insurance claim is made in favor of the plaintiff-insured, but
the majority of the court is not prepared to state that as an absolute rule. Reserve Life was cited as an example
of the type of case which would not have fallen within such a rule. He stated that the court would also not
set forth the converse as an absolute; that is, it does not necessarily follow that when a plaintiff-insured is
given a directed verdict on the contractual liability, he will automatically be entitled to a punitive damages
instruction to the jury. Id. at 843.
Justice Robertson, joined by Justices Prather and Anderson, wrote a concurring opinion to the denial of the
petition of rehearing, calling the majority opinion in Blue Cross a "substantial step out of the murky bog of
the Step One-Two-Three formulations of Reserve Life. "Id. at 856. He set out what he believes the bad faith
law ought to be in Mississippi, basically reiterating his concurring opinion from Reserve Life and urging the
court to go further in setting out the substantive and procedural guidelines for trial judges to follow in bad
faith cases.

